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Abstract
This paper investigates the diiculties of creating economic, social, and environmental values when operating as a hybrid 
venture. Drawing on hybrid organizing and sustainable business model research, it explores the implications of alternative 
forms of business model experimented with by farmer owned, fairtrade social enterprise Cafédirect. Responding to changes 
and challenges in the market and societal environment, Cafédirect has tried multiple business model innovations to deliver 
on all three forms of value capture, with difering levels of success. This longitudinal case study, therefore, provides a con-
tribution to our understanding of how business models enact hybrid mission, providing a platform for triple-bottom-line 
value capture. In doing so, we are able to expand on the normative understandings of integrating hybrid objectives, and the 
complications of multiple types of value capture.
Keywords Fair trade · Hybridity · Hybrid organizing · Social enterprise · Sustainable business models · Governance · 
Sustainability
Abbreviations
CPF  Cafédirect producer foundation
CPL  Cafédirect producer limited
FTOs  Fairtrade organisations
NPD  New product development
Introduction
Literature has increasingly identiied that social enterprises 
are hybrid organizations operating between diferent institu-
tional logics (charity logics and commercial logics), which 
can conlict creating hybrid tension (Battilana and Lee 2014; 
Jay 2013; Santos et al. 2015; Phillips et al. 2011). A hybrid 
is the ofspring of two diferent species, or varieties, and is 
produced when elements from the two diferent species are 
combined into one unit or organism. Hybrid organizations 
thus bridge, or straddle, the conventional categories of 
private, public, and non-proit sectors (Austin et al. 2006; 
Battilana and Lee 2014; Billis 2010; Seibel 2015). Each of 
these sectors has a dominant logic (Thornton et al. 2012) and 
organizing template (Billis 2010), and most organizational 
forms can be readily identiied as belonging to one of these 
sectors (Billis 2010; Haigh and Hofman 2014; Seibel 2015).
The private sector logic prioritizes income generation 
from commercial activities, e.g., sales, contract fees, etc., 
and maximization of inancial returns to shareholders. In 
contrast, the public sector logic is grounded in creating pub-
lic beneit and the principal of collective choice. Finally, 
non-proit sector logic is characterized by philanthropy, 
advocacy, and participation (Hansmann 1980). Organiza-
tional forms that straddle institutionalized sectoral logics 
are labelled ‘hybrid’ and are found in a range of constella-
tions such as private–public (Jay 2013; Lehner and Nicholls 
2014), private-non-proit, and public-non-proit hybrids 
(Seibel 2015). Social enterprises, such as Cafédirect, are a 
classic hybrid (Battilana and Lee 2014; Dees and Elias 1998; 
Billis 2010) and are found in many industries such as, micro-
inance (Khavul 2010), energy (Rogers et al. 2012), retailing 
(Wilson and Post 2013), food (Doherty and Tranchell 2007), 
housing (Mullins et al. 2012), and health care (Santos et al. 
2015).
  Iain A. Davies 
 i.davies@bath.ac.uk
 Bob Doherty 
 bob.doherty@york.ac.uk
1 University of Bath, Claverton Down Road, Bath BA2 7AY, 
UK
2 The York Management School, University of York, 
York YO10 5DD, UK
 I. A. Davies, B. Doherty 
1 3
Battilana and Lee (2014, p. 397) introduce the concept 
of “hybrid organizing”, deined as the activities, structures, 
processes, and meanings by which organizations make sense 
and combine multiple institutional logics. However, the ield 
of sustainable business models has also emerged to explore 
how organizations adapt their business architecture to 
address the creation of multiple forms of economic, social, 
and environmental values (Bocken et al. 2014; Rauter et al. 
2015). Limited research, however, has attempted to integrate 
these two approaches, to investigate how hybridity manifests 
across business models to deliver multiple forms of value 
(Davies and Chambers 2018; Margiono et al. 2017).
To investigate these phenomena, this paper focuses on a 
17 year longitudinal case study into prominent UK social 
enterprise, Cafédirect. It is a farmer owned, fairtrade hot 
drinks social enterprise, and was the irst fairtrade brand 
to become commonly stocked by major UK retailers. It 
was founded by four UK organizations involved in poverty 
alleviation: Oxfam (an International Charity), Traidcraft (a 
fairtrade social enterprise), Equal Exchange (fairtrade and 
organic cooperative), and Twin Trading (NGO working on 
market access for small-holder farmers). The mission was to 
pioneer fairtrade cofee and tea into mainstream distribution, 
whilst improving the livelihoods of small-holder farmers in 
developing economies.
This paper investigates the challenges of operating a 
hybrid enterprise over the long term. We investigate how 
external environmental challenges, and a drive to improve 
social and environmental value, led to a series of internal 
strategic decisions which manifest as dynamic changes to 
the Cafédirect business model. We provide a rare exploration 
into a failure to increase triple-bottom-line value [economic, 
social and environmental (Elkington 1997)] as a result of 
the lack of organizational balance. In particular, we explore 
why the organization’s embedded hybridity causes tensions 
leading to this failure. In doing so, we extrapolate on the 
implications of trying to deliver on too many types of value 
(Santos et al. 2015), with too many diferentiated activities 
that do not integrate the diferent forms of value (Battilana 
et al. 2012). Therefore, we contribute to both the literatures 
of hybrid organizing and sustainable business models by 
integrating both emerging theoretical approaches, to pro-
vide insight into the complementarity of the two ields. We 
show how tensions between competing logics are managed 
to deliver multiple forms of value capture. In doing so, we 
expose the vital importance of balancing societal and com-
mercial logics efectively, to make them complementary 
within the value creating activities embedded within the 
business model.
The paper is presented in four sections. First, we syn-
thesize the current literatures on hybridity and sustainable 
business models, identifying how both address similar 
issues in relation to the delivery of multiple forms of value, 
leading to our research objective to explore how strategic 
decisions changing the business model afect the salience 
of hybrid tensions, and ability to capture triple-bottom-line 
value. Second, we present our choice of methods, case selec-
tion, and data analysis. Fourth, we present the results of our 
17 year study, documenting the environmental challenges 
and hybrid tensions which have driven marked periods of 
business model innovation. Finally, we discuss the practical 
and theoretical implications of this extensive case.
Literature Review
According to the European Commission (2017), a social 
enterprise is deined as an entrepreneurial organization that 
engages in economic activity and focuses on achieving wider 
social, environmental, or community objectives. In addition, 
they are independent and employ participatory governance 
models, and, if inancial surpluses are generated, they are 
largely reinvested in societal objectives (European Com-
mission 2017). Social enterprises are “not aligned with the 
idealized categorical characteristics” of the private, public, 
or non-proit sectors (Doherty et al. 2014, p. 3), and, by 
pursuing the combined achievement of commercial, social, 
and environmental value capture, are thus a classic hybrid 
organizational form (Battilana and Lee 2014; Defourny and 
Nyssens 2006; Billis 2010). By bridging institutional sec-
tors, social enterprises draw on multiple institutional values 
and practices (Phillips et al. 2011). However, the conlicting 
logics of generating commercial value, at the same time, 
as generating social and environmental value, can create 
organizational tension (Austin et al. 2006; Pache and Santos 
2013; Smith et al. 2013). Literature suggests that organiza-
tions can manage these tensions through the dimensions of 
hybrid organizing (Battilana and Lee 2014), or through a 
sustainable business model (Bocken et al. 2016; Davies and 
Chambers 2018). We investigate the extant literatures on 
each of these topics in turn.
Hybrid Tensions
Battilana et al. (2012) and Ebrahim et al. (2014) address 
the issue that many social enterprises’ have diferent organi-
zational activities relating to their commercial and societal 
value creation. Both papers identify two types of hybrid 
venture: integrated hybrids, where social and environmen-
tal impact is often served through the same activities as 
economic value creation, and differentiated hybrids when 
social and environmental value creation requires additional 
organizational activities to the economic value creation. 
This second type is particularly prevalent where the social 
enterprises’ beneiciaries are diferent to the social enter-
prises’ customers (Santos et al. 2015). Structural separation 
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is the commonly suggested solution, in which the two sets 
of activities are decoupled into compartmentalized subu-
nits to negate this tension (Battilana et al. 2012; Mason and 
Doherty 2016). Conversely, Battilana et al. (2012) suggest 
hybrids should try to ind mechanisms to integrate these 
diferentiated activities, leading to commercial and societal 
beneits simultaneously. However, as organizations have lim-
ited resources, diferent value creation activities may still 
compete for these scarce resources, particularly, inancial, 
physical, human, and network capital.
The multiple potential missions in social enterprises 
causes tensions in the available sources of inancial and costs 
of physical resources (Austin et al. 2006; Dacin et al. 2010). 
Research has noted that social enterprises have access to 
fewer resources than commercial ventures, because those 
controlling resources (such as investors) are uncertain about 
how the organization will combine the social objectives with 
a inancial return (Austin et al. 2006; Hansmann 1980; See-
los and Mair 2005). Social enterprises also often purpose-
fully pay more for their raw materials due to their relation-
ships with beneiciary groups, and thus have higher costs 
of goods than commercial rivals, e.g., fairtrade (Hockerts 
2015). To respond to the negative impact of social mission 
on access to resources, social enterprises draw on novel 
resource acquisition strategies such as bricolage, where they 
create value by combining a range of existing but underval-
ued resources, e.g., relationships with beneiciaries (Desa 
and Basu 2013; Di Domenico et al. 2010). There is also a 
growth in sources of social inance and crowd funding to 
alleviate inancial capital limitations (Lehner and Nicholls 
2014); however, access to these can be limited (Davies et al. 
2018).
Tensions are also present in how social enterprises man-
age human resources. Recruitment is shaped by the skill 
requirements of the social enterprise (Smith et al. 2012). 
For example, in work integration social enterprises, usually 
only disenfranchised members of society (ofenders, home-
less, disabled, etc.) are recruited to deliver on social and/or 
commercial objectives (Pache and Santos 2013). For social 
enterprises that do not rely on donations or grant funding for 
survival [termed earned income by Defourny and Nyssens 
(2008)], Battilana and Dorado (2010) found that trying to 
recruit employees with similar identities and goals to the 
enterprise was often a diicult task. Conversely, a study of 
employment and motivation in community inance organi-
zations found that employees who had previously worked 
in private sector inance accepted reduced remuneration in 
exchange for a personal desire to work for an organization 
that provides beneits for society (Bell and Haugh 2014). A 
study of the hybrid Wholefoods (USA) found that managers 
who embrace the competing logics inherent to hybrid organ-
izations are less likely to create internal conlicts (Besharov 
2014). However, hybridized individuals are not usually easy 
to ind, as most people are still socialized into one dominant 
employment sector. A number of authors, therefore, sug-
gest various approaches for the socialization of employees 
to assist in embracing the logics including creating spaces 
for negotiation, induction with beneiciaries, and control 
systems that embrace both aspects (Battilana and Dorado 
2010; Santos et al. 2015).
In terms of network capital, relationships with stakehold-
ers are an important resource for creating value, because 
they allow enterprises to acquire scarce resources, as well 
as gain access to markets, and create greater social impact 
(Austin 2010). Alliances range from formal cooperative 
structures such as joint ventures, partnerships, licensing 
(Austin 2010), and social franchising (Tracey and Jarvis 
2007), to less formal mechanisms such as sharing ideas 
freely and allowing others to scale up an innovative approach 
(Lyon and Fernandez 2012). However, social enterprises 
have a challenge in establishing their legitimacy with difer-
ent stakeholders (Kraatz and Block 2008; Zuckerman 1999). 
Crucke and Knockaert (2016) in their study of WISEs in 
Belgium found that boards that appoint representatives from 
diferent stakeholder groups have been found to encounter 
fault lines between the interests of diferent subgroups. This 
may render the social enterprise hybrid slow to respond to 
opportunities or threats and impact on commercial, social, 
and environmental goal achievements. Communicating 
efectively with these partners can also be problematic due 
to diferent terminology across diferent logic organizations 
(Teasdale 2012), and some stakeholders struggle to under-
stand the multiple types of value that the social enterprise is 
attempting to create. For example, in cooperative hybrids, 
external stakeholders such as inancial investors, or busi-
ness partners have particular commercial expectations which 
may conlict with the needs of the enterprises’ beneiciaries 
(Santos et al. 2015). The choice of partners for social enter-
prises can, therefore, be problematic, because legitimacy 
with other stakeholders is inluenced by the reputation of the 
chosen partner (Austin et al. 2006; Moizer and Tracey 2010). 
Close relationships with organizations embedded in more 
established sectors can assist social enterprises in accessing 
needed resources (Austin 2010). However, some partners 
can compromise the social enterprises’ hybrid nature (Smith 
et al. 2012).
The need to satisfy a wide array of external stakeholders 
produces tensions which pervade across the entire organi-
zations business model (Lumpkin et al. 2013; Mason and 
Doherty 2016). Nevertheless, responding appropriately to 
the demands of diferent stakeholder groups has been associ-
ated with strategic efectiveness (Battilana and Dorado 2010; 
Brown and Iverson 2004). Stakeholders, therefore, play a 
key role in shaping management direction, which can create 
greater tensions between the social and commercial objec-
tives (Teasdale 2012).
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Hybrid Organizing
Empirical studies on managing conlicting demands are few. 
However, the implications of a failure to manage hybrid 
tensions emerge from a number of studies. For instance, 
an analysis of two microinance organizations found that 
intractable identity conlicts between banking and develop-
ment logics led to “an impasse which made it impossible to 
operate efectively” (Battilana and Dorado 2010, p. 1427). 
The impasse was resolved after staf resignations, dismissals, 
and strategic reorientation. Conversely, Phillips et al. (2011) 
document the demise of Aspire (a mail order catalogue) 
attributing it to the prioritization of social mission above 
commercial sustainability. These failures highlight the dif-
iculty social enterprises have in mitigating hybrid tensions.
Battilana and Lee (2014), in their conceptual paper, pro-
pose ive dimensions of hybrid organizing to manage hybrid 
tensions: (1) organizational activities, (2) workforce com-
position, (3) organizational design (4) culture, and (5) inter-
organizational relationships, many of which are alluded in 
Sect “Hybrid Tensions” above. In essence, Battilana and Lee 
(2014) address the issue that to maintain legitimacy, hybrids 
need to maintain appeal to multiple audiences by integrating 
activities, resources, structure, culture, and partners. Inte-
grated approaches can be found in the business models of 
Grameen microinance where the beneiciary and customer 
are one and the same (Khavul 2010), or in sustainable entre-
preneurs where disrupting markets with more sustainable 
alternatives, provides both more sustainable consumption, 
and revenue for the enterprise (Davies and Chambers 2018). 
Through integrating the ive dimensions of hybrid organ-
izing to deliver multiple forms of value simultaneously, 
organizations are more likely to be recognized as legitimate 
members of multiple institutional forms (Battilana and Lee 
2014). However, for some social enterprises, their social and 
commercial activities are not integrated, but diferentiated 
(Battilana et al. 2012). If you take Shoreditch Development 
Trust (London), for example, their commercial activity is 
renting workspace via regenerated buildings, which fund 
entirely separate activities with various community projects 
for disadvantaged groups. The separated activities can lead 
to trade-ofs between the subunits that compete for similar 
resources (Arradon 2007). Jay (2013) introduces the concept 
of the ‘service paradox’, whereby trying to serve one con-
stituency can, therefore, involve failing to adequately serve 
another one. Navigating this service paradox by developing 
selective approaches to integration can be helpful (Ebrahim 
et al. 2014). At a leadership level, managers who embrace 
the competing logics limit conlict (Besharov 2014; Wald-
man and Bowen 2016). However, there has been limited 
empirical investigation on the process and conditions for 
integration, or on communicating this integration to stake-
holders (Dey and Teasdale 2016).
Battilana and Lee (2014) suggest the dimensions of 
hybrid organizing constitute organizational features that 
can be, to a lesser or greater extent, integrated to respond to 
social and commercial logics. A more nuanced approach; 
suggested by Santos et al. (2015), however, is to consider 
not the mission logics, but the type of value capture. Rather 
than focusing on individual dimensions of hybrid organizing 
to overcome tensions, this view looks at the alignment of 
the business model towards creating and capturing multi-
ple types of value. They focus particularly on the extent to 
which societal value can ‘spillover’ from the commercial 
activities. This views organizations as not having a singu-
lar societal and singular commercial logic, but potentially 
multiple forms of value creation happening simultaneously. 
Santos et al. (2015), therefore, identify that societal value 
can be an automatic spillover from commercial activities, 
e.g., paying a fairtrade premium to producers, but can also 
be a contingent spillover, requiring third parties to develop 
interventions to ensure societal beneit, such as funding a 
charity who provide work place support and training for dis-
advantaged members of society. The overall alignment of the 
business model to facilitate the spillover of societal value, in 
the view of Santos et al. (2015), becomes more fundamental 
than the logics underpinning the desired value.
Sustainable Business Models
The term ‘business model’ has been applied as a generic 
term to describe how social enterprises are managed by a 
number of authors including Santos et al. (2015), Hahn and 
Ince (2016), and Wilson and Post (2013). However, social 
enterprise researchers are only now attempting to integrate 
the hybrid organizing and business models literatures from 
a theoretical perspective (Davies and Chambers 2018).
Despite the often generic uses of the term leading to con-
ceptual confusion (Osterwalder et al. 2005), business mod-
els (as a theoretically deined ield) describe the organiza-
tional architecture which sits between strategy and activities 
(Osterwalder et al. 2005; Teece 2010). As such, it forms 
the basis for understanding how an organization positions 
itself to create and capture value in a market (Stähler 2002; 
Rauter et al. 2015). Business models are a representation 
of the approaches that organizations develop to deliver the 
value that they intend to capture (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund 
2013). Traditionally, this theory has been applied to eco-
nomic value capture (Teece 2010), but, in recent years, there 
has been a shift to consider economic, social, and environ-
mental value capture through the emergence of sustainable 
business models research (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund 2013; 
Zott et al. 2011). This stream of research seeks to understand 
how organizations embed sustainability as part of a triple-
bottom-line value creation and capture approach.
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Sustainable business model theory has predominantly 
explored economic value-driven organizations’ move-
ment towards more sustainable business practice (Boons 
and Lüdeke-Freund 2013). This ield demonstrates that a 
successful transition to more sustainable business practice 
requires a robust business model which targets integrated 
activities towards automatic spillover type triple-bottom-line 
value creation (Baumgartner and Ebner 2010; Bocken et al. 
2014). However, limited research has empirically explored 
organization set up with triple-bottom-line value capture at 
their core, such as social enterprises (Lüdeke-Freund et al. 
2017; Margiono et al. 2017), and none explore hybrids 
with diferentiated activities, or contingent value spillover 
(Davies and Chambers 2018).
Despite a lack of theoretical integration, normative 
analyses of sustainable business models often turn to social 
enterprises in their description of sustainable business model 
archetypes (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund 2013; Bocken et al. 
2014; Grassl 2012). Grassl (2012) provides the most explicit 
exploration of social enterprise business models by present-
ing a series of diferent interactions between beneiciaries, 
social enterprises, and the market, as a means of distinguish-
ing high-level manifestations of a social enterprise busi-
ness model. Although the exploration is at a high level of 
abstraction, it shows the strong overlap between dealing with 
hybrid tensions and ensuring that an appropriate business 
model emerges. Bocken et al. (2016) go one step further 
and explore how business model innovation—the process of 
creating or transforming a business model—is at the heart of 
success in three large, well-documented social enterprises 
(Amul, Aravind and BRAC). All of which could be broadly 
termed integrated hybrids (Ebrahim et al. 2014), with largely 
automatic value spillover (Santos et al. 2015). However, we 
once again see the beneit of mapping the business model for 
understanding triple-bottom-line value capture.
What constitutes the core elements of a business model 
is founded on Osterwalder et al.’s (2005) identiication of 
the building blocks of business models (value propositions, 
target customers, distribution channels, market relationships, 
value coniguration, core competency, partner network, cost 
structures, and revenue model). These were coalesced by 
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) into the business model can-
vas. In Fig. 1, the nine elements of Osterwalder and Pigneur 
(2010) business canvas have been grouped based on Bocken 
et al.’s (2014) reorganization of the business model building 
blocks into their three core elements of Value Propositions, 
Value Creation and Delivery, and Value Capture dimensions. 
This business model canvas has been frequently used in the 
literature to explore successful business models directed at 
sustainable value capture (Franca et al 2016; Geissdoerfer 
et al. 2016; Joyce and Paquin 2016). Some such as Joyce and 
Paquin (2016) create diferent canvases for economic, social, 
and environmental value capture, indicating the potential 
for exploring diferentiated hybrids, although this appears 
Fig. 1  Business model canvas synthesized from Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) and Bocken et al. (2014)
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to be at odds with the overall idea of a holistic business 
model targeting triple-bottom-line value capture (Boons and 
Lüdeke-Freund 2013). In this paper, we, therefore, focus 
on the business model canvas as presented in Fig. 1 as the 
basis for understanding how hybrid tensions can be both 
magniied and addressed, through business model innova-
tion. In particular, we focus on how changes in the external 
environment, and internal decision-making, towards more 
diferentiated activities and multiple forms of value capture 
manifest in a reshaping of the business model. We also then 
demonstrate how business model innovation can help to rea-
lign activities to ensure a better integration towards deliver-
ing automatic and contingent value spillover.
The research objective of this paper is, therefore, to 
explore how decisions which change the business model 
at social enterprise Cafédirect afect its ability to manage 
the hybrid tensions and multiple forms of value capture. 
In doing so, we expose the vital importance of balancing 
societal and commercial logics efectively, even when there 
are diferentiated activities producing both automatic and 
contingent value spillover. We show how a deiciency in 
integration across the activities leads to near failure, and 
how rebalancing the activities through structural separation, 
and the explicit identiication and management of diferenti-
ated activities has led to recovery.
Methodology
The exploratory nature of the research question favors 
a phenomenological approach to data collection (Miles 
and Huberman 1994). A single longitudinal case study is 
justiied on the basis of both the revelatory nature of the 
case (Yin 2003), the longitudinal nature of business model 
innovation, and the privileged access to data allowing deep 
insight into a complex and highly nuanced ield of study 
(Glaser 1992).
Case Selection
Cafédirect provides a clear context for investigating sustain-
able business models and managing hybridity-derived ten-
sions. Founded in 1991 by four mission driven organizations 
(see “Introduction”), Cafédirect was subject to a marketing 
and networks based case study in Journal of Business Ethics 
in 2010 (see Davies et al. 2010). Cafédirect’s core economic 
activity (selling hot drinks) is undertaken as a tool to serve 
the social goals (empowering small-holder farmers and pull-
ing them out of poverty) and more latterly environmental 
goals (climate change adaption in growing communities and 
creating zero-carbon supply chains). Table 1 provides infor-
mation on the company today. Ta
b
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The case is particularly revelatory as it provides insight 
into the challenges of managing a hybrid organization over 
the long term, as the internal and external environments 
change. The case organization has three clearly identii-
able periods of business model innovation over the time-
frame of data collection, which form the basis for the case 
presentation below. Periodization is a qualitative historical 
research approach for condensing complex temporal data 
into sequential time periods with fairly distinct start and end 
points (Witkowski and Jones 2006). Here, we follow that 
Hollander et al. (2005) suggest of periodization based on 
turning points in the narrative of the study context; rather 
than discrete periods of time, to more accurately convey the 
key turning points in Cafédirect’s business model. These 
involve not only changes in the structure, and branding of the 
enterprise, but also major changes in its objectives related to 
social and environmental value spillover, and level of inte-
gration of commercial versus societal activities (Hollander 
et al. 2005).
Data Collection
The data used in this case study draw on an ongoing 17 year 
qualitative study into the organization. The commencement 
of this study predates both the emergence of hybrid organ-
izing and sustainable business models literatures, but the 
deep and ongoing nature of the data collection allows for 
revisiting issues of hybridity and the organizations evolving 
business model throughout the study period. The longitudi-
nal case study approach draws on qualitative data (observa-
tion, interviews, and attendance at corporate events such as 
Annual General meetings and ield visits to producer com-
munities), and secondary data (annual reports, shareholder 
documents, internal company reports, market performance 
data, statistics, and surveys) providing information of rel-
evance to the study (Goulding 2001; Yin 2003). Table 2 
provides a summary of the qualitative data collected over 
the duration of this study.
Distinct periods of formal data collection have been 
undertaken, utilizing mixed qualitative methods (see 
Table 2). In addition, both authors have continuously worked 
in and researched the sector for over 20 years. Participant 
and personal observation were recorded through formal and 
relexive research diaries and audio recordings. Although 
formal recording of this speciic phase of data collection is 
blurred by the ongoing nature of the study, approximately 
800 h observation has occurred over the 17 years.
A total of 36 semi-structured key informant interviews 
with Cafédirect employees from senior management groups, 
sales and marketing teams, and supply-chain department 
have occurred over the period, with incalculable informal 
interviews and discussions, both face-to-face and via tel-
ephone. In each phase, the chairperson, managing director/
CEO, and marketing/commercial director at the time have 
been interviewed, as well as relevant other employees based 
on a snowballing approach guided by the relevant issues of 
the time, including marketing managers, logistics managers, 
salespeople, head of sustainability, and those working with 
producer groups. In addition, 29 formal supplementary inter-
views across the marketplace from producers, supply-chain 
partners, retailers, and the fairtrade establishment have also 
informed the understanding of the periodization of business 
Table 2  Data collected across the three periods
2000–2003 2004–2009 2013–2017
Head oice observation 2 visits, (~ 120 h) 4 visits, (~ 100 h) 5 visits (~ 130 h)
Other observation Touring with the marketing team 
at public events such as the 
Edinburgh Fringe festival and 
retailer visits In Scotland and 
Wales (~ 100 h)
Direct observation of three annual 
general meetings from 2006 
to 2008 and associated notes 
and informal discussion with 
employees and shareholders
Plus direct observation at ten pub-
lic fairtrade fortnight campaign 
events including discussions 
with employees and supporters 
(~ 130 h)
Direct observation of eight annual 
general meetings from 2009 
to 2016 and associated notes 
and informal discussion with 
employees and shareholders
Direct observation and informal 
interviews with producers at the 
Cafédirect Producers conference 
Entebbe, Uganda March 18–19th 
2013
Direct observation of 15 fairtrade 
campaign events including infor-
mal discussions with employees 
of both Cafédirect and their 
supporters (~ 200 h)
Formal interviews with Cafédirect 12 interviews 13 interviews 11 interviews
Formal interviews with Cafédi-
rects partners and customers 
about Cafédirect
8 interviews 14 interviews 7 interviews
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model. All formal interviews were recorded leading to over 
80 h of recorded material, transcribed, and then checked by 
the interviewee for accuracy.
Data Analysis
To ensure internal validity and reliability, a constant com-
parative method was utilized (Barnes 1996). Multiple 
responses were compared against each other, ield notes, 
and secondary sources. We subsequently interpreted these 
data outputs and provided underlying rationales for the com-
pany’s actions from the data (Eisenhardt 1989). External 
validity and reliability was increased through triangulation 
with both secondary sources (news media, industry reports, 
internal reports, sales ledgers, etc.), third-party interview 
data (such as network partners), and taking versions of the 
work to the case organization for their feedback and com-
ments (Askey and Knight 1999).
Interviews were transcribed and run through a series of 
categorization, abstraction, and comparison processes to 
identify themes which contribute to theory development 
(Spiggle 1994). Aspects of theory were then reviewed itera-
tively to decide on the direction of future data collection and 
emergent themes were then put to participants for review 
and reinement prior to writing the inal document. It was at 
this later stage that the relevance of business models became 
apparent, and data were then reanalyzed to build the busi-
ness model periodization presented below.
Findings
As discussed above, this section is organized as a periodi-
zation based on the diferent business models which domi-
nated at Cafédirect over its historical phases. Figure 2 pro-
vides a summary of the movement in the value spillover, 
and level of integration between commercial and societal 
value spillover activities throughout the period of study. 
Period 1 (1991–2008) covers the business model which 
emerged through the enterprise’s rapid growth phase, 
which was a simple integrated business model where 
commercial success in selling beverages was directly 
linked to societal value through fairtrade premiums paid 
to producers (automatic value spillover), and donations for 
producer support to Twin Trading through social premi-
ums and proit sharing (contingent value spillover). The 
Davies et al. (2010) paper explores the marketing activi-
ties of period 1, and we have included the diferent eras 
of brand positioning (solidarity, development, and mass-
marketing) from that paper in the below igures for con-
sistency, but Cafédirect’s approach to value creation and 
capture was efectively the same throughout this period, 
and thus, the business model remained consistent. Period 
2 (2009–2012) follows the implications of Cafédirect tak-
ing more ownership of the activities related to its ben-
eiciaries value creation. This led to the development of 
diferentiated activities focusing on three diferent forms 
of value: economic (income), social (producer income and 
welfare), and environmental (tackling climate change), 
providing multiple forms of both automatic and contin-
gent value spillover. Period 3 (2013–2017) explores the 
attempt to reintegrate the forms of value capture through 
the structural separation of some value creating activities. 
Although the value capture still maintained both automatic 
and contingent forms, the business model shows more 
integrated activities. The complexity and depth of data 
collected make exhaustive citation to sources impractical. 
However, indicative sources for observed or triangulated 
data sources are included in parenthesis.
Period 1: Simple Value Creation: Integrated Business 
Model
From its foundation in 1991 until 2008, Cafédirect’s busi-
ness model changed little, with similar intended value 
creation activities, and approaches to value capture. There 
had been a number of changes over this period, such as 
rebranding, increased retailer coverage, an initial public 
ofering, and product extensions (Davies et al. 2010). Nev-
ertheless, the integration of activities and the type of value 
captured were largely consistent.
Fig. 2  Cafédirect’s value spillover and business model integration 
over the periods
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Challenges and Opportunities
Fairtrade certiication was in its infancy when Cafédirect 
was founded. The original mission, passed down by its four 
founding organizations, was to survive entirely from com-
mercial revenue for the purpose of creating four types of 
societal value: protecting producer livelihoods with a mini-
mum agreed price for cofee [following the 1989 cofee price 
crash which saw an 86% drop in cofee prices following the 
dismantling on the International Cofee Agreement (ICO 
2004)], providing producers with higher long-term income 
and welfare provision to promote poverty alleviation through 
producer support and development initiatives (PSandD), 
educate consumers about where products come from and liv-
ing conditions for producers, and “pioneering the Fairtrade 
Mark” into the mainstream retail marketplace (interview 
with the Managing Director 2001). From the start, Cafédi-
rect always went “far beyond the minimum fairtrade stand-
ards”, and minimum levels of PSandD expected of partici-
pants in the Fairtrade certiication scheme (former Chairman 
of the Fairtrade Foundation in 2007). Cafédirect funded their 
own PSandD through their Gold Standard producer support 
pledge, administered by producer empowerment NGO Twin 
Trading. Twin Trading also handled all supply-chain man-
agement, leaving Cafédirect to focus on marketing and sell-
ing (ield observations and various interviews). In essence, 
the main function of Cafédirect was to communicate with 
the mainstream about fairtrade and sell as many fairtrade 
hot beverages as possible, to raise money to give to Twin 
Trading for producer support. One key informant from the 
supermarket sector commented in 2007:
Cafédirect was one of the first innovators in Roast and 
Ground coffee, highlighting the provenance of the cof-
fee and their work with farmers, they really stood out.
The Business Model
Our interpretation of the business model canvas for Café-
direct in Fig. 3 shows that the company was running an 
integrated business model. Cafédirect were driven by eco-
nomic value capture, automatically contributing to consumer 
education and pioneering Fairtrade through increased sales 
and distribution. Contingent value spillover in relation to 
PSandD through social premiums and proit sharing was 
administered via Twin Trading, meaning that it sits outside 
Fig. 3  Cafédirect’s business model period 1
 I. A. Davies, B. Doherty 
1 3
the direct activities on Cafédirect’s business model. Man-
ufacturing was also outsourced to third-party suppliers 
(Keith Spicer and Gala) and even retail relationships were 
outsourced, irst to cofounder Equal Exchange, and then to 
sales broker Bridgethorne in the supermarket sector. Ulti-
mately, the Cafédirect business model up to late 2008/early 
2009 was simple: a brand management and marketing com-
pany, trying to maximize sales and revenue, and minimize 
costs to pass as much money on to Twin Trading as possible. 
We identify this as an integrated business model, because 
the economic value creation activities lead directly to the 
societal value. This allows Cafédirect to focus purely on the 
commercial business logic.
Hybrid tensions as discussed in the literature were, as 
such, minimal. We observed that the governance structure 
with NGOs, social enterprises, charities, and producers 
guiding the mission, a specialist partner managing contin-
gent societal value capture, and a workforce focusing on 
income generation, prevented role uncertainty and potential 
mission drift. Human resourcing issues were relatively sim-
ple, and over the irst periodization, we observed the work-
force transition from people initially “requisitioned from 
the founders” (interview with Founder board member in 
2002), to a leadership team of social mission driven people 
ensuring the governance of the enterprise, but supported 
by a workforce drawn from relevant mainstream commer-
cial backgrounds. This appears to have ensured maximum 
income generation as suggested by this marketing manager, 
formally from Mars, in 2002:
Although this is obviously a much smaller company, 
so challenges are different, my job of trying to make 
the brand as appealing to customer as possible is the 
same.
Financial capital; which had become something of an 
issue leading into the 2000’s, was addressed with an initial 
public ofering in 2004, which was largely taken up by 
consumer supporters (Cafédirect Plc. 2004), providing 
something more akin to community shares, than tradition-
ally traded stocks. Cafédirect’s was a traditional commer-
cial business model, but with an interesting story, having 
producers as recipients of dividends instead of sharehold-
ers. This gave them a unique value proposition for many 
years, gaining them access to markets, free advertising, 
PR, and alliance partners. A leading food journalist com-
mented in 2006:
Cafédirect were very effective at securing main-
stream media coverage in leading high quality news-
papers and food magazines. They had a great brand 
story to tell, of doing good with coffee
Tensions related to legitimacy with external stakehold-
ers also appeared to be well managed by this model. Mar-
keting communications evolved to focus on product quality 
and evocative images of highland landscapes, leaving the 
Fairtrade Mark to proxy for the ethical branding (see Fig. 4 
and Davies et al. 2010). The area in which tensions did 
emerge was in relation to the fairtrade social movement. 
Some fairtrade “activists”, from which Fairtrade Certii-
cation had emerged, were against Cafédirect’s mission of 
pioneering fairtrade into the mainstream, considering it 
a “dilution of the ethos of alternative trading” (interview 
with a member of Equal Exchange in 2002). Overtime 
fractures between Cafédirect and its founders as well as 
with the Fairtrade certiication bodies began to emerge. 
One key informant at Cafédirect commented in 2009:
The tension at board level started to significantly 
delay decision making. We took our eye off the ball 
with regard to developing the brand at a time when 
external competition started to intensify. We should 
have been investing time in NPD rather than arguing 
at board level over governance matters
Fig. 4  Previous brand packag-
ing (from Davies et al. 2010)
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The Results
By 2008, Cafédirect was the fourth biggest cofee brand in 
the UK with a turnover of £22.3 m (Cafédirect Plc. 2009). 
They operated in growing markets with fairtrade growing 
at an average of 45% per year from 2007 to 2009 (Mintel 
2008), and fairtrade cofee at 27% per year (Fairtrade 
Foundation 2014). Even though a 2004 public ofering 
reduced the founders’ shareholding from 25 to 10% each, 
the maintenance of a “golden share”; which could veto 
any social mission afecting decision, plus the provision 
of shares and board seats to producer groups, meant mis-
sion drift was unlikely. Therefore, via its Gold Standard 
programme, Cafédirect had been able to divert 60% of 
its operating proit to PSandD over the previous 8 years. 
However, with success came new challenges.
Period 2: Increasing Value Spillover: Diferentiating 
the Business Model
As early as 2007, the realization emerged that Cafédirect 
had to change, which was evident in multiple interviews 
and observations of weekly strategy meetings. Custom-
ers increasingly bought fairtrade, but had a little ability 
to identify Cafédirect as being “…anything diferent to 
supermarket own-brands” when both carried the Fair-
trade Mark (Marketing Manager comment in 2008). Sales 
growth had stagnated, and “new product development 
had stalled” (CEO interview in 2012). However, producer 
problems had changed too, and to serve them better Café-
direct had to change.
Challenges and Opportunities
On the commercial front growth in Fairtrade, cofee and 
tea markets were all predicted to slow (Mintel 2008). The 
mainstreaming of fairtrade in the early 2000s had dramati-
cally changed the composition of the fairtrade market, away 
from social enterprises like Cafédirect, towards a plethora of 
other organizations using diferent value chains with vary-
ing rationales for fairtrade engagement (see Doherty et al. 
2013 for the full history of this). Major brands, and own-
label supermarket brands, both carrying the Fairtrade Mark, 
and matching Cafédirect’s quality, were becoming widely 
available, but at vastly lower prices than Cafédirect could 
achieve whilst maintaining its Gold Standard commitments. 
The growth of supermarket fairtrade own label, with 63% 
of Fairtrade cofee sales, is a particularly notable change 
at this time (AC Nielson 2015). The hot drinks’ category 
had also seen the rise of other, cheaper, and less stringent 
sustainability certiication labels such as Rainforest Alliance 
(Mintel 2013b), which many consumers cannot diferentiate 
from Fairtrade (Davies and Gutsche 2016).
In terms of societal value spillover, however, there were 
also environmental changes. It was becoming apparent that 
although, in the short-term, improved income was important 
to producers, long-term issues related to the environment 
(particularly climate change) and crop dependence were 
becoming equally, if not more important. Many of Cafédi-
rect’s producers began to sufer the efects of climate change, 
with one producer commenting at the Cafédirect’s producers 
conference in 2013, “we are battling against cofee leaf rust 
which has intensiied due to changing climatic conditions” 
(a fungal infection which kills cofee plants) and soil quality 
(which was reduced due to poor rainfall and high winds). 
Cafédirect, therefore, had the opportunity to expand its work 
with producers to include climate change adaption and crop 
diversiication. The impact of the decisions to create new 
types of societal value led Cafédirect to adapt its value creat-
ing activities, which manifested in a distinct change in the 
business model.
The Business Model
In terms of value spillover, Cafédirect from 2006 onwards 
had been engaged in exploring climate change adaption. 
They partnered with German carbon emissions company 
GTZ to look at ways of reducing emissions in their supply 
chain, and ofsetting those they could not reduce to become 
zero carbon (Cafédirect Plc. 2010). With growers, they had 
invested proits from commercial activities into connecting 
producers via mobile phone discussion forums, to share 
information on climate change adaption (presentation at the 
AGM in 2012), and they also helped farmers to plant new 
cofee plants to replace those blighted by cofee rust (Cafédi-
rect Plc. 2009). There was, therefore, a gradual but insistent 
shift from Cafédirect as a fairtrade brand to Cafédirect the 
sustainable cofee and producer advocacy company. With 
this, we observed an increased diferentiation of activities, 
with the purely commercial focus on Cafédirect giving way 
to a mixture of activities related to climate change, which 
competed for leadership time and organizational resources.
To deal with the challenge of greater competition, and 
to explain the diversiied work with growers, Cafédirect 
believed that it needed to “rejuvenate its brand” (CEO at 
the AGM in 2009). One rationale for this redesign stemmed 
from the belief within Cafédirect that its brand was too 
closely associated with the Fairtrade Mark, which was no 
longer representative of the value spillover achieved, and 
according to one informant in 2009:
Cafédirect had allowed itself and its brand to be 
defined as Fairtrade and then when everybody else 
comes along and offers the same benefits and the same 
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story but with cheaper prices. Then the consumer is 
going to think if all that brand stands for is Fairtrade 
and I can buy that 50pence or a £1 cheaper! Why am 
I spending extra money?
The company set out on an exercise to target their cus-
tomers with a stronger social message that would appeal to 
the ethics of their customers. The irst phase was to iden-
tity who was buying Cafédirect. The analysis suggested two 
core customer segments that the company termed dark green 
and light green: dark greens going out of their way to buy 
ethically/environmentally, and light greens open to the idea 
but potentially not purchasing so frequently. As such, they 
had a core market of existing customers and some potential 
growth into new customers. Focus groups were then used 
with participants selected from both segments to shape the 
brand image and message.
Following this, the packaging was redesigned to show 
authentic tools used by growers to tend their crops (see 
Fig. 5). According to the CEO of Cafédirect in 2009:
The aim was to show our point of difference by captur-
ing the pride and passion of the growers and to dem-
onstrate our special connection between smallholder 
craftsmanship and taste.
The key message of the rebrand was on what was unique 
about Cafédirect (i.e., farmer owned, being a sustainability 
pioneer, having close relationships with farmers). However, 
for many of the employees at Cafédirect, this left an unre-
solved issue for an authentic branding exercise—they needed 
to deal directly and “live up to their name” (CEO in 2014). 
To be authentic, Cafédirect decided to go the extra mile 
and shorten their supply chain, developing a new business 
model, as depicted in Fig. 6.
For 13 years, sales broker Bridgethorne had represented 
Cafédirect in the UK supermarket sector, and in April 2009, 
their contract was terminated bringing sales in-house. Bridg-
ethorne were viewed by supermarket retailers as one of the 
best sales brokers in that sector. One key informant from the 
supermarket sector said in 2010:
Fig. 5  Provenance rebrand image
Fig. 6  Cafédirect business model period 2
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We have a very good working relationship with Bridg-
ethorne and they were very knowledgeable about the 
hot beverage sector. We miss that level of expertise
In addition, since the inception of Cafédirect, Twin Trad-
ing had both purchased the cofee for Cafédirect, and man-
aged the PSandD. One senior manager explains in 2012:
At one point in the business [Cafédirect] nobody 
picked-up the phone to talk to a supermarket or a pro-
ducer group. Now we had decided to live up to our 
name and go direct.
In 2009, Cafédirect brought PSandD in-house. This 
brought the previous value spillover that was contingent 
on Twin Trading, in-house, and as such became automatic 
spillover—and needed new processes, mechanisms, and 
people to achieve it. Three new staf members were, there-
fore, brought in to manage supply chain, product quality, 
and producer relationships, respectively. This all followed 
on the back of replacing the former CEO (a long-time social 
activist and leader in social enterprise) with a former fast 
moving consumer goods Marketing Director. With increas-
ing responsibility for creating automatic value spillover in 
relation to PSandD, plus newer contingent value spillover on 
climate change and supply-chain sustainability, the whole-
management structure changed. The new CEO’s lack of 
experience in sustainability issues was managed through 
the creation of a new middle-management post of Head 
of Impact and Sustainability. They also hired three retail 
sales executives to replace Bridgethorne. As shown in our 
depiction of the business model in Fig. 6, Cafédirect became 
more complex, covering an array of diferentiated economic, 
social, and environmental activities, with both automatic and 
contingent value spillover.
The Results
These changes meant that Cafédirect had reduced its cost 
base. Bringing the sales operation in-house saved the com-
pany “£600 k in sales commission in the irst 12 months” 
alone (Logistics Manager interviewed in 2012). Cafédirect, 
therefore, remained strong in terms of net assets, which were 
£12 m, and also had cash in the bank of £4 m at the end of 
2009 (Cafédirect Plc. 2010). The removal of Bridgethorne 
also allowed Cafédirect to go directly to retailers with the 
companies story, something multiple interviewees suggested 
Bridgethorne struggled to do.
At face value, these decisions to change organizational 
activities appear logical. However, the decisions taken 
in combination proved to be an unmitigated disaster (see 
Fig. 7). The company’s turnover declined from £23 m in the 
year to December 2008 to £15.7 m for the year to Decem-
ber 2010, a reduction of 35% (Cafédirect Plc 2011). A key 
moment appears to be June 2009 (1 month after the rebrand), 
when monthly sales dropped by £500 k from the previous 
month (Cafédirect monthly sales ledger, June 2009).
Fig. 7  Catastrophe at Cafédirect
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What occurred was a signiicant shift in the business 
model from one in which the societal and commercial log-
ics were integrated, leading to contingent value spillovers in 
PSandD; to a far more complex social impact driven busi-
ness model involving direct sales, logistics, supply manage-
ment, environmental, PSandD, etc. In doing so, the organiza-
tions social and environmental value capture moved from a 
simple contingent model of donating money through trad-
ing and proit sharing, to actively managing automatic value 
spillover in terms of PSandD, plus contingent approaches to 
environmental management with partner organizations in 
climate change adaptation and crop diversity. This brought 
many hybrid tensions to the forefront of the organization, but 
we will focus on the six crucial tensions which we identiied 
through our analysis, which had both unbalanced the inte-
grated nature of the previous business model and impacted 
on the hybrid organizing dimensions (Battilana and Lee 
2014).
(1) Workforce Composition Tensions With all the changes, 
we observed that no member of the marketing or sen-
ior management team from a previous rebrand in 2004 
was still at the enterprise in 2009. Most of the market-
ing and sales team had come from corporate FMCG 
companies, as had the new CEO that joined in 2008, 
with limited knowledge of how to market a brand’s eth-
ics authentically (Shareholder comment at Cafédirect, 
AGM 2012). We interpret from our observations that 
Cafédirect had diiculty integrating an explicit, core 
social impact message in the value proposition. This 
message had been implicit through certiication, and 
secondary to the luxury and quality messaging dur-
ing the 2000s, when the company was governed by 
an experienced social enterprise leader. With the new 
leadership and marketing team, the lack of experience 
in branding a social enterprise was largely lacking, 
and we suggest that the heavy focus on sustainability 
as the core message may have expedited a decline in 
the brand attractiveness to consumers. The evidence 
from discussions which we observed and commentary 
by interviewees who participated in the process was 
that there was simply an overestimation of the power 
of ethical messaging in consumer markets.
(2) Customer Communication Tensions Although esti-
mates vary, Vermeir and Verbeke (2006) synthesize 
that approximately 30% of consumers have a positive 
attitude towards ethical consumption. This 30% would, 
therefore, fall in either the light green or dark green 
category targeted by Cafédirect. However, evidence 
shows that an ethical attitude does not always translate 
into buying behavior (Devinney et al. 2010). In Cowe 
and Williams’s (2000) much cited study, they name the 
30:3 phenomena where the 30% of consumers high-
lighting ethical consumption attitudes lead to only 3% 
ethical purchases. Therefore, Cafédirect who, in 2007, 
held a 14% market share in roast and ground cofee 
were already extended well beyond the true dark and 
light green market space of people willing to purchase 
on ethical messaging alone. The movement from the 
more egocentric, luxury cofee consumption message, 
with implied ethics, to a more altruistic ethics dominant 
message created a tension between customer expecta-
tions, and organizational oferings. As one employee 
relected in 2013: “First and foremost people buy that 
category to satisfy a need and that’s great quality cof-
fee”, we would suggest that the workforces’ over-com-
pensation for their lack of social enterprise experience 
caused them to overlook this point. The sales collapse 
is, therefore, consistent with Obermiller et al.’s (2009) 
study, suggesting that smaller fairtrade brands need to 
focus primarily on quality-based value propositions, 
with ethical appeal secondary.
(3) Value Proposition Tensions The Commercial Director 
also discussed (2012) how in focus groups you have 
time to explain the rationale behind packaging ideas:
You can explain the idea of tools and explain 
why you are doing it, you can explain that those 
tools are used to craft that coffee and you can talk 
about the care and attention that has gone into 
growing the coffee.
  However, purchasing decisions for products such as 
fairtrade cofee are low cognition and habitual (Davies 
and Gutsche 2016). The complex back-story behind 
the packaging cannot be conveyed. Sales results sug-
gest that Cafédirect got this value proposition balance 
wrong.
(4) Branding Tensions The changes in both brand names 
and colors simultaneously resulted in consumers ind-
ing it diicult to locate the new packs in the supermar-
ket. One Cafédirect supporter commented in 2012:
I have been buying Teadirect for years and I just 
could not find the new product on the shelf, the 
product was in the store but the white pack color 
makes it so difficult to see even to the trained eye.
  The new tools packaging design also proved unpopu-
lar with new employees at Cafédirect, one informant 
divulges in 2013;
People just couldn’t relate to a pair of secateurs 
on the pack to great tasting coffee and in fact 
slightly the opposite, as rusty implements on the 
pack does not communicate a positive view.
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  Or even worse, “the only word I can think of is 
tools that look like instruments of torture” (Marketing 
Executive in 2013). Both interviewees’ relections and 
our own interpretation suggest that the company got 
the branding wrong. The laws in this redesign created 
the situation where consumers had to reappraise what 
brands they bought, as the quote above identiies. This 
is particularly critical in hot drinks such as tea, as tea 
brand choice is largely driven by habit, with 55% of the 
UK population buying the same brand of tea all of the 
time (Mintel 2013b).
(5) Channel Management Tensions The failure of the brand 
to maintain a strong identity was compounded by the 
change in retailer relations. Poor sales performance 
combined with the lack of personal relationships via 
Bridgethorne (interviews with supermarket buyers 
2013), led to a 50% decline in sales of Cafédirect tea 
(informal discussion with the Logistics Manager in 
2012). The supermarkets were not convinced by the 
new social impact messaging (interviews with super-
market buyers 2013) and although, in the long term, 
the removal of Bridgethorne might lead to the devel-
opment of better relationships; Cafédirect lost all the 
social capital Bridgethorne that had with retailers.
(6) Commercial Focus Tensions During the 1990s, Café-
direct was recognized for being innovative in the pre-
mium cofee sector with its Roast and Ground range. 
However, between 2004 and 2011, product innovation 
stagnated. This was compounded by increasing NPD 
activity from its competitors (Mintel 2013a). By the 
end of the inancial year to December 2011, Cafédi-
rect’s revenue was down to nearly 50% compared to 
the inancial year to December 2008 (see Fig. 7). Gross 
margin also declined to 21% in the inancial year to 
December 2011, from 29% in the year to December 
2008 and Cafédirect recorded operating losses of 
£640 k and £700 k in the years to December 2010 and 
2011, respectively (Cafédirect 2014). This was exacer-
bated by a continued loss of retail distribution. Accord-
ing to one senior manager “Cafédirect lost 40% of its 
distribution points by the end of 2011”. This poor per-
formance led to a number of changes in 2012 including: 
a new CEO and chair both with hybridity management 
experience, combined with three departures at board 
level, and a new commercial director, with a signii-
cant experience in the FMCG sector (Cafédirect 2013; 
Annual meeting observation 2013). The new team took 
the decision to restructure the remaining business to 
manage the decline.
Period 3: Structural Separation of Value Creating 
Activities
Following the catastrophic impacts of the unbalanced period 
2 business model, the very existence of Cafédirect was 
threatened. By the end of 2012, sales volumes had halved, 
and turnover reduced to £13.68 million, they had made an 
operating loss for 4 consecutive years, purchase volumes 
from producers had fallen over 60%, social premium and 
proit sharing more than halved (Cafédirect 2013b). There-
fore, across the board, the attempt to increase value spillover 
had backired, with reduced commercial, social, and envi-
ronmental value capture.
Challenges and Opportunities
The misalignment in the business model represented in 
Fig. 6 during 2009–2010, with too much focus on the social 
and environmental value creation, needed addressing to 
ensure survival. Cafédirect aimed to maintain producer sup-
port and work on climate change adaption, but with sales 
volumes halving since 2009, this put the company under 
immense strain. Cafédirect entered its decline in 2009 in 
a fairly healthy inancial position. This gave the company 
a good bufer. However, by the end of 2015, cash reserves 
were less than £0.3 m and current assets down to £3.7 from 
£12 m (Cafédirect 2015). In 2009, Cafédirect donated £700 k 
to PSandD, over and above their Fairtrade premiums, despite 
barely breaking even (Cafédirect 2010). However, this was 
forced to be reduced year-on-year to only £188 k in 2014 and 
2015 (Cafédirect 2015). Furthermore, a reduction in pur-
chased raw material volumes from 4000 tons during 2008, 
to only 1276 tons during 2014, saw total fairtrade premiums 
fall from £886 to £352 k (Cafédirect 2015).
One area where being a hybrid caused distinct problems 
for Cafédirect throughout the years of observation is that 
they are ultimately in business to help support the farm-
ing community, rather than just making money. This should 
counterbalance in fairtrade organizations, because there 
should be a high level of integration between social and 
commercial activities. However, Cafédirect had lost this 
balance, as the CEO explained in 2014:
We need to craft the balance between the commercial 
and social objectives and we have [had to] become 
more entrepreneurial over the past 2 years.
For a commercial enterprise, reducing income can (to a cer-
tain extent) be ofset by switching suppliers, and certainly 
reducing charitable donations. In Cafédirect’s case, this was 
not possible. The growers owned 5.5% of the business by 
2014. Furthermore, a commitment to their Gold Standard 
included agreeing long-term supply contracts and proit 
sharing. Breaking these would undermine the company’s 
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social mission. However, by 2012, the company had to make 
a key decision: risk further decline, or change strategy and 
try to rebuild the brand with increased focus on their com-
mercial objectives.
Despite increased competitive pressures, Cafédirect were 
able to maintain strong relationships with growers. Cofee 
producers were under enormous strain due to climate change 
problems, including increases in pestilence, and failures of 
annual frosts which are necessary for high yield (interview 
with commercial manager from KNCU cofee cooperative 
in Tanzania 2014; Cressey 2013). This led to a constrained 
supply across the cofee market with increased competition 
for raw material supply. A Cafédirect producer speaking in 
2014 explains:
MNCs are not just sitting in their headquarters any-
more they are sitting in the local villages with their 
agents and traders trying to source every little grain of 
coffee and trying to convince our coops to sell outside 
their cooperatives to them.
Cafédirect has always been a small customer for producer 
cooperatives, so it would be easy to withdraw supply from, 
but Cafédirect has experienced “zero defaults on supply” 
(interview with the Supply Chain Manager 2014). The work 
with producers on aspects such as climate change adapta-
tion built goodwill with growers. However, poor inancial 
performance led to issues with both the ability to continue 
supporting producer initiatives, and maintain purchase levels 
from these loyal suppliers. Many, therefore, sought other 
sources of income, such as through Organic and Rainfor-
est Alliance certiication (Interview with the Supply Chain 
Manager in 2014).
The Business Model
As Cafédirect moved into this new era, they had to face up 
to the hybrid tensions. We identify four major strategic deci-
sions which reshaped the business model between late 2011 
and 2013: reintegrating organizational activities and restruc-
turing, a commercial rebrand, refocusing on new product 
development, and augmenting the business model to ensure 
that it continued to provide impact for growers (see Fig. 8 for 
our interpretation of this business model period).
(1) Reintegrating Activities and Restructuring In 2011, sig-
niicant changes took place with the founding members 
divesting their £2.7 m, 40% shareholding in Cafédirect 
down to 10%, and keeping only one position on the 
board (Cafédirect Plc. 2012). At the same time, the 
cooperative inancial institution Oikocredit increased 
their shareholding in Cafédirect from 11 to 20%, with 
consumers buying the remainder of the divested shares, 
plus a further share issue to increase cash low (Cafédi-
rect Plc. 2012). The golden share which gave founder 
Fig. 8  Cafédirect business model phase 3
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members veto rights over 56 articles of association was 
passed on to the Board, giving them power to change 
their principles, if necessary, to save the company.
  Cafédirect also revised their mission in 2013, by 
moving away from explicitly tying the mission to Fair-
trade certiication, and showed its preferred identity as 
a sustainable enterprise, which (as of writing) included 
Fairtrade certiication in practice, but not in the articles 
of association:
“A rebalanced world which celebrates business 
as a force for good and measures success in the 
shared well-being of the communities it touches...
Beyond Sustainability by; securing access to 
resources and opportunities for true well-being 
for future generations.” Cafédirect’s New Mission
  The producer’s 5.5% equity was now constituted as 
the charitable foundation: Cafédirect Producers Founda-
tion (CPF), and was managed totally independently of 
the company. The structurally separated CPF became 
entrusted with managing the PSandD funds (donations 
from Cafédirect), and governed by a chair and three 
producer directors, who also sit on Cafédirect’s Board 
(presentation by the Chair of the CFP at the AGM in 
2012). The CPF; due to its charitable legal status, can 
also raise additional funds to go with the Cafédirect 
donations. They raised two 4 year programme grants 
from UK charity Comic Relief of £600,600 each for 
climate change adaptation works in 2012 utilizing this 
freedom. From this change in governance structure, CPF 
can function efectively without Cafédirect donations, 
thus guaranteeing ongoing social impact. However, a 
constitutional change in 2011 also committed Cafédirect 
to provisioning 33% of operating proit to CPF regard-
less of their net inancial performance (CEO statement 
at the AGM in 2012). This had the efect of simplify-
ing Cafédirect’s business model to focusing on com-
mercial value creation, for onward donation of PSandD 
money to a legally separate third party (CFP). Value 
spillover, therefore, reverted to a contingent model for 
PSandD-related activities, as it did before 2009.
  Further revenue decline in 2012 and 2013 led to a 
strategic review, resulting in a limited restructuring, 
with ive redundancies in early 2014 (e-mail exchanges 
with the CEO prior to the 2015 AGM). This included 
the Head of Impact and Sustainability. Impact and 
Sustainability were now led by the CEO, with Gold 
Standard Key Performance Indicators included in every 
employee’s objectives, and with social and environ-
mental spillover reviewed quarterly alongside inancial 
measures. The CEO explained in an interview in 2015 
that, by integrating the responsibility for sustainability, 
rather than having it operate through a diferent set of 
activities, the company’s commercial value creation 
became linked to the sustainability agenda.
(2) A Commercial Rebrand Cafédirect had “18 years of 
equity in the pre-2009 product designs” (Commer-
cial Director in 2012), so they researched what con-
sumers valued in their original designs following the 
failure of the authentic tools branding. This revealed 
a strong preference for both the rich evocative packag-
ing colors, and also the orange strip, which, according 
to the research, made the packs recognizable on the 
retail shelf (interview with Commercial Director in 
2012). This new consumer research involved an inde-
pendent attitudinal segmentation study, using data from 
the Target Group Index survey (TGI data)1. This study 
segmented hot drinks‘ consumers who have a range of 
ethical beliefs, who are interested in quality, and who 
are not highly price sensitive (Cafédirect Segmenta-
tion Booklet 2013). This research identiied six groups 
totaling 9.4 m UK hot drinks‘ consumers and two 
priority groups to form Cafédirect’s new target audi-
ence. These two segments were termed worldly foodies 
(aluent urban professionals driven by a love of quality 
food and provenance and ethics—1.7 m people), and 
healthy foodies (primarily female, love cooking, and 
have a healthy lifestyle with strong ethical beliefs and 
an interest in provenance—1.8 m people). These seg-
ments were identiied by the research as heavy users of 
roast and ground cofee, with foodie and ethical values. 
The Cafédirect penetration within these two groups was 
only 13%, equivalent to 440,000 shoppers in June 2013 
(Cafédirect Segmentation Booklet 2013).
  Cafédirect investigated these new target groups, 
including those people who did and did not buy Café-
direct. The research showed that Cafédirect met their 
taste and quality requirements, and also identiied the 
diferentiating elements of the Cafédirect brand. These 
included the small-holder focus, direct trading, and 
the investment of proits in small-holder communi-
ties (Cafédirect Segmentation Booklet 2013). These 
became the three pillars of Cafédirect’s diferentiated 
brand positioning, brought together in a communication 
message titled ‘made the small way’ (see the packaging 
in Fig. 9). An explanation of the pillars was included 
on the back of the packs, stating what Cafédirect means 
in terms of working with small-holder producers, the 
text reads ‘these small-holders have lived on the land 
1 Target Group Index (TGI) survey is the longest established single 
source marketing and media survey in Britain and was established by 
the British Market Research Bureaux in 1969
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for some time, they’ve got more pride and passion in 
their cofee, there is more craft that goes into the crop; 
therefore, you get a better tasting cofee and the beneits 
go to the grower directly to reinvest in a better future’. 
Therefore, according to a Marketing Manager at Café-
direct in 2013:
We are now trying to say what’s in it for you the 
consumer and provide an insight for those types 
of consumers who believe that things that are 
made better taste better.
  In contrast to the authentic tools rebrand, this showed 
Cafédirect attempting to bring together the interrelated 
hybrid dimensions of both quality and social position-
ing, rather than being purely focused on producer value 
creation. One of the challenges, however, was commu-
nicating this diferentiation with a limited marketing 
budget. Cafédirect had been forced to cut their con-
sumer marketing spend to less than £0.7 m in 2014 
compared to the £4 m spent in 2006 (Cafédirect 2015). 
In 2015, they took the decision to raise this spend to 
£1.1 m. To manage this, Cafédirect developed its social 
media presence, growing its followers and launching an 
online advertisement.
(3) New Product Development Cafédirect’s more in-depth 
understanding of its target consumer allowed them to 
be more consumer focused; creating products and com-
munications that spoke to a more tightly deined target 
audience (ield observations, and multiple customer 
and retailer interviews). A problem repeatedly empha-
sized by many interviewees, both inside and outside 
Cafédirect, was a realization that NPD had previously 
been driven by the support for producers, rather than 
what the market demands. One senior manager at Café-
direct in 2015 explained:
The passion for the roots of Cafédirect are still 
here, but the commercial focus is becoming 
stronger, as everybody is desperate to get the 
company growing again to prove the model works.
  This illustrates the challenge of managing the hybrid-
ity within social mission companies, and the need to 
maintain a balance between the commercial and social 
logics. The ‘made the small way’ campaign is an exam-
ple of product positioning, where social and environ-
mental criteria are integral to the quality dimension. 
This is supported by Cafédirect data, showing that 18% 
of their total sales come from one of their single origin 
cofees, Machu Picchu (Cafédirect Sales Ledger 2014). 
NPD for 2013 included a new single origin Costa Rican 
roast and ground cofee. For 2015, they also developed 
a premium instant cofee, cofee pod products, and a 
single origin black blended tea range.
(4) Augmenting the Cafédirect Business Model: Cafédirect 
departed from its normal organic growth on June 1st 
2014 by purchasing a new cofee club business called 
Kopi cofee (e-mail exchange with CEO in 2014). This 
e-commerce business dealt directly with consumers via 
home delivery of single origin specialty cofee, improv-
ing the relationship with consumers beyond the super-
market retail environment, and allowed Cafédirect to 
strengthening value creation and delivery (interview 
with the Commercial Director in 2015). This facilitated 
Cafédirect trading as directly as possible, as explained 
by the CEO in 2015:
[Kopi Coffee] gets our connection with growers 
and drinkers to be much closer and have much 
more dialogue, and it offers alternative and high-
value, and I think the supply chain is more in our 
control than I think the multiple grocers.
  After trading in 2014/15 under the Kopi brand, this 
online business has now been rebranded as Handpicked 
by Cafédirect with sales growing at over 100% per year.
  Furthermore, Cafédirect commenced going direct 
to business customers such as the Royal Albert Hall 
and Glastonbury Festival. Cafédirect was nominated 
through a tender process to be a preferred direct sup-
plier of UK Universities (interview with the Com-
mercial Director in 2015). Cafédirect also made some 
important choices with regard to retail partnerships, 
deciding to align itself with those retailers which share 
some of the same values such as Cooperative Food, and 
Sainsbury’s and Waitrose Supermarkets. It also rebuilt 
its commercial partnership with fairtrade pioneer Traid-
craft going from £300 k to over £500 k sales (interview 
with the CEO 2016).
  Cafédirect also developed new markets, particularly 
the ‘out of home’ hot beverage food service sector, 
which was worth £3bn in UK, with a growth of 8.1% 
since 2006 (interview with food service sales manager 
Fig. 9  Made the small way rebrand
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2015). Cafédirect refocused on both the food service 
wholesalers and the end user in this sector, e.g., the 
Emirates football stadium (interview with the CEO in 
2016).
The Result
Signs of recovery began in 2015 (see Fig. 10) with Cafédi-
rect roast and ground cofee sales up by 22%, overall cofee 
sales were up 14%, and hot chocolate up by 16% (AC Niel-
son 2015). In contrast, Cafédirect instant cofee was down 
2%. Furthermore, Cafédirect’s core business of roast and 
ground cofee has outperformed a number of its competitors 
for the irst time since the early 2000’s (AC Nielson 2015). 
However, the double digit growth of roast and ground cofee 
was counterbalanced by Cafédirect losing 11 distribution 
points in Tesco supermarket due to a price-driven range 
review (interview with Cafédirect’s supply-chain manager 
at the 2015 AGM). In contrast, Cafédirect sales at Wait-
rose supermarkets were up over 10% in 2015 and 2016 on 
the back of a joint Cafédirect–Waitrose cinema advertising 
campaign in 2014 (interview with CEO 2016). Neverthe-
less, despite a tea recovery plan, Cafédirect sales of tea 
continued to decline. Tea as a whole market was down by 
− 3.7% in volume and − 6.1% in value, with Cafédirect tea 
down 15% in 2016, but some areas of the tea market are 
growing, e.g., specialty teas, which Cafédirect aim to move 
into (interview with CEO 2016).
Discussion and Conclusions
There is an increasing acceptance that managing social 
enterprises is problematic due to the sometimes conlict-
ing organizational purposes (Austin et al. 2006; Pache and 
Santos 2013; Smith et al. 2013). The literature on hybrid 
tensions in social enterprises is, however, in its infancy 
(Doherty et al. 2014), with a few papers exploring how these 
tensions manifest in the social enterprises, or how they are 
managed (Frumkin and Andre-Clark 2000; Phillips et al. 
2011; Teasdale 2012). By investigating hybrid tensions lon-
gitudinally, through the evolutions of Cafédirect’s business 
model, we identify some causes of intensiication of hybrid 
tensions, such as changing the balance of value capture 
objectives, diversifying the value creation activities under-
taken, and changing the customer value proposition. We also 
explore the means by which this single case attempted to 
increase multiple forms of value in a more integrated and 
balanced way, and alleviate some of these tensions (albeit 
not always successfully).
Cafédirect provides a clear example of a social enter-
prise that felt tensions in trying to balance its commercial 
objectives and addressing changes in its intended environ-
mental and societal value capture. Consequently, they made 
changes to include new forms of inancial support for grow-
ers, as well as dealing with issues of climate change, and 
climate change adaption, which they were not doing before 
2008. In particular, the level of automatic value spillover 
(Santos et al. 2015) they were actively managing changed 
Fig. 10  Cafédirect business performance 1997–2015
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through period 2 increased markedly. In doing so, Cafédirect 
appeared to priorities social and environmental objectives 
over commercial objectives, creating a diferent balance 
to the organization from both its earlier and later business 
models. Ultimately, they attempted to make organizational 
changes relected in every box of their business model can-
vas (see Figs. 3, 6, 8), and appear (in our interpretation) 
to make the whole organization more complex, with more 
diferentiated activities focused on diferent value capture 
objectives, which made it far more open to hybrid tensions. 
The competition between these activities for management 
time and organizational resources led to a lack of clear direc-
tion, and a lack of focus on the commercial aspects of the 
enterprise, leading to an ultimate reduction in all forms of 
value capture.
The core theoretical contribution of this paper is in link-
ing the ields of hybrid organizing and sustainable business 
models, and the implications for each in terms of their ongo-
ing theoretical development in explicating hybrid organiza-
tions. In their seminal paper, Battilana and Lee (2014) iden-
tify ive dimensions upon which organizations must manage 
their hybridity: (1) organizational activities, (2) workforce 
composition, (3) organizational design, (4) culture, and (5) 
inter-organizational relationships. Rather than separating 
these out as independently manageable, the ield of sustain-
able business models provides the opportunity to view these 
as part of an integrated approach, leading to multiple types 
of value capture. Taking this broader view, we are able to 
identify the interlinkage between these aspects, and posit 
that changing the level of integration or diferentiation in 
any of these areas will have knock-on efects to the rest of 
the business model, potentially leading to destabilization as 
seen in Cafédirect.
By refocusing attention on the types of value spillover 
(Santos et al. 2015), and the value creating activities which 
lead to this value spillover, rather than Battilana and Lee’s 
(2014) focus on the competing logics, we can better identify 
where contingent and automatic value spillover will opti-
mize societal value. Santos et al. (2015) focus on the inter-
play between automatic and contingent value spillover, and 
the extent to which beneiciaries are the same people as the 
customers. They propose that where societal value is cre-
ated automatically, and where clients and beneiciaries are 
the same people, mission drift, and inancial instability, and 
thus, hybrid tensions are lessened. However, we propose a 
more nuanced interpretation.
First, organizations often have more than one type of soci-
etal value spillover. As we see in Cafédirect, these can be 
both automatic and contingent on third parties, dependent 
on the business model in operation (such as in the diferent 
states of the PSandD value spillover in periods 1 and 2). 
Where third parties are required for the capture of contin-
gent value spillover, it does not necessarily infer a higher 
chance of missions drift as suggested by Santos et al. (2015). 
Indeed, in the Cafédirect case, the movement to greater auto-
matic spillover in relation to PSandD had the opposite efect 
due to the diferentiation of activities, and, in our interpreta-
tion, a lack of the dynamic capabilities in-house to deliver 
on the new forms of value capture (Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000). As such, we propose that if the missions and dynamic 
capabilities of the third party are synergistic with the value 
creation activities of the hybrid, contingent spillover allows 
for greater potential value capture in total, and a reduction in 
hybrid tensions as each organization focuses on its own area 
of expertise. Indeed, at Cafédirect, both inancial stability 
and potential for mission drift increased with the move to 
automatic value spillover due to the diferentiation of activi-
ties for commercial and societal value creation.
We agree with Santos et al. (2015) that customers also 
being beneiciaries would reduce hybrid tensions, but mainly 
because it would be more likely lead to a greater integra-
tion of activities. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 2, the level of 
integration of activities targeting the types of value spillover 
is of great importance, not just the type of value spillover. 
We, therefore, propose Fig. 11 to build on the work of San-
tos et al. (2015), Battilana and Lee (2014), Battilana et al. 
(2012), and Ebrahim et al. (2014) in identifying the potential 
inter-relationship between activity integration, types of soci-
etal value spillover, and the nature of hybrid tensions. Where 
automatic spillover is directly captured by the commercial 
activities, this would present the least likely scenario for 
hybrid tension, mission drift, and inancial instability (lower 
left-hand quadrant, Fig. 11). In particular, if the societal 
value is embedded in the product or service ofered [e.g., in 
sustainable entrepreneurship (Davies and Chambers 2018)]. 
However, contingent value spillover can be just as stable 
where the third-party dealing with the contingent value 
Fig. 11  Nature of hybrid tensions in relation to activity diferentiation 
and value spillover
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capture has the requisite dynamic capabilities and mission 
to achieve it (lower right-hand quadrant, Fig. 11). Hybrid 
tensions are likely to emerge when commercial and societal 
value creation activities compete due to diferentiation in 
value creating activities (upper quadrants, Fig. 11). Investi-
gating the sustainable business models of hybrid enterprises, 
therefore, provides a valuable tool for practitioners to map 
out potential areas in which diferentiation of value creating 
activities may be present, and how they could be managed 
as per Fig. 11.
Utilizing the business model canvas based on Bocken 
et al.’s (2014) reinement: value proposition, value crea-
tion and delivery, and value capture, we can extrapolate on 
the potential sources of hybrid tensions and investigate the 
implications of this study.
With regard to the value propositions, there is limited 
extant literature related to hybrid tensions in the marketing 
of social enterprises. Hahn and Ince (2016) and Moss et al. 
(2011) explicitly state the need to incorporate hybridity into 
social enterprise value propositions. However, both Dey and 
Teasdale (2016) and Davies and Chambers (2018) suggest 
the opposite that hybrid ventures should tailor messaging 
to the target audience, not the mission. Our case appears to 
conirm the later view, social enterprises should focus on 
producing stakeholder centric messaging. We expand on this 
in the case by exploring the potential tensions in approaches 
to customer segmentation, value proposition development, 
brand messaging, and communication complexity. In each 
of these areas, we see that shifting the value proposition 
communications to a more societal impact focus exposed the 
company to many risks, as the external parties fail to move 
with the organization. Cafédirect could have actioned many 
of the strategies targeting societal impact, without communi-
cating them to retailers and consumers. Latterly, a movement 
back towards commercial communication (even if now in a 
niche market) has stabilized the sales decline. Therefore, we 
propose that social enterprises should prioritize customer 
value creation in their customer facing value proposition, 
making hybrid/social aspects more implicit (Obermiller 
et al. 2009). The majority of customers purchase consumer 
goods for their functional or symbolic meaning, not their 
ethics (Davies and Gutsche 2016). Creating unnecessary ten-
sion through convoluting these messages is problematic for 
the commercial value capture. We also propose that those 
customers with strong ethical inclinations will still be satis-
ied via the more implicit messaging.
With regard to value creation and delivery, ensuring the 
correct balance of social and commercial skills and experi-
ence on the board, partner organizations, and in the com-
mercial delivery team is essential. Cafédirect pursued a staf 
recruitment strategy of FMCG experience at all organiza-
tional levels, leading to a knowledge gap in how to market 
an ethical brand. They also tried to integrate equivalent skills 
in retail sales and producer support, pulling away from busi-
ness partners with a wealth of skills and experience. When 
Cafédirect faced up to its tensions, this resulted in the depar-
ture of the CEO and other board members. By integrating 
growers onto the board, and adding a Chairperson and new 
CEO with experience in hybrid type ventures, and revert-
ing to contingent value spillover, a clearer more integrated 
strategy for dealing with hybrid tensions emerged. The case 
study highlights the potential danger of overcomplicating 
the value creating activities in hybrid ventures (Baumgartner 
2009). Cafédirect’s original model was, in our opinion, rela-
tively simple and well integrated. Creating both automatic 
(customer education and fairtrade premiums) and contingent 
(PSandD and proit sharing) value spillover simultaneously 
with increased sales (thus showing an integrated approach). 
This reduced both job role uncertainty in the workforce, and 
allowed the governance mechanisms of the enterprise to 
focus on societal value capture, whilst the workforce focused 
on commercial value capture, in particular marketing and 
branding activities. The automatic value spillover in terms 
of customer education and pioneering fairtrade involved no 
diferentiation from the commercial activities of marketing 
and selling more products. However, in period 2, concep-
tualized in the second business model (see Fig. 6); fewer 
business partners were engaged in value creation activities, 
bringing about both an increase, and a diferentiation of 
activities within the organization, with a notable negative 
efect. In period 3, by reverting, via structural separation, 
to the previous form of contingent value spillover based on 
donations to a third party to conduct PSandD (although, in 
this instance, the third party is a related entity), job role 
certainty was somewhat improved. In addition, value creat-
ing activities were simpliied and reintegrated with the new 
key performance indicator processes. This has then driven 
forward commercial expansion through new product devel-
opment, new channels, and an augmented business model, 
all targeting growing sales long-term.
With regard to value capture; as discussed in Fig. 11, 
focusing on contingent value spillover is unproblematic if 
the partner is more capable of achieving that value capture. 
Cafédirect in 2009 failed to understand the consequences of 
terminating its alliances with its contingent value capture 
partners (Twin Trading and Bridgethorne). This resulted in 
external tensions associated with legitimacy, particularly in 
the retail sector. Even at its largest Cafédirect was only 39 
people, and trying to manage far too many aspects of its 
triple-bottom-line business model became untenable. By 
simplifying the business model to allow others to manage 
value capture in the areas of their expertise, it eases hybrid 
tensions from day-to-day activities. Active management of 
partners and governance systems can, therefore, be seen to 
open up possibilities to new ways of working, which help to 
promote both commercial and societal value capture. This 
 I. A. Davies, B. Doherty 
1 3
further supports the work of Crucke and Knockaert (2016) 
who warned of the dangers of fault lines occurring in com-
plex governance structures which were not aligned to the 
hybrid mission.
The overarching lesson from this case, however, is the 
danger of not managing a business model with an integrated 
strategy. Boons and Lüdeke-Freund (2013) explicitly state 
that business models are designed to manage complex and 
potentially conlicting goals. The whole ield of sustainable 
business models demonstrates the nature of this integrated 
approach to managing multiple forms of value capture which 
sheds new light on the dimensions of hybrid organizing 
(Baumgartner 2009; Bocken et al. 2016; Rauter et al. 2015). 
Ironically, this literature draws on social enterprises as 
archetypal examples of these integrated approaches (Boons 
and Lüdeke-Freund 2013; Bocken et al. 2014; Grassl 2012), 
yet the social enterprise literature itself focuses on conlict 
and tensions (Austin et al. 2006; Battilana and Lee 2014; 
Smith et al. 2013). By taking a sustainable business model 
approach, it is possible to identify via a ine-grained analysis 
of value capture where these tensions may potentially exist, 
but also helps to identify new hybrid organizing dimensions 
for alleviating these tensions. By investigating how to make 
a single integrated business model, as opposed to diferenti-
ated models for social, environmental, and economic value 
creation, it is possible to identify a business model which 
minimizes hybrid tensions, and facilitates the integrated 
attainment of multiple forms of value capture.
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